Wednesday, March 4, 2015

Scott in Mexico

During the 1840s, Mexico was a major concern in the foreign policy of the United States, and Winfield Scott was major figure in the military developments there. The tensions between the two countries centered on territorial claims.

Texas had been a part of Mexico until it declared itself to be an independent republic in 1836. It existed autonomously until 1846, when the U.S. Congress approved its request to become one of the United States.

While Mexico had tolerated the reality of an independent Texas republic, the Mexican government was not eager to see Texas become part of the Union.

As tensions rose, the likelihood of armed conflict increased, and military planners began to analyze various types of action in Mexico. One officer doing such work was Winfield Scott, who was one of the dominant figures in American military thought in the years between 1815 and 1860: in the years between the War of 1812 and the Civil War.

It was during the War of 1812 that Scott began his career and achieved some fame. He was a senior office by the time tensions with Mexico arose. Brion McClanahan writes:

Before the War Between the States, a handful of American generals had garnered the respect and admiration of the whole American people. Just below George Washington in this pantheon of heroes was Winfield Scott, a man who is hardly remembered today but who was considered by his contemporaries to be without equal. It was not until later, cataclysmic American wars, from the 1860s to the twentieth century, that his fame was eclipsed. Scott was born in Virginia on his family’s plantation, Laurel Branch, in 1786. His father had served during the American War for Independence and his mother counted the prestigious Mason and Winfield families among her ancestors. Scott’s father died when he was six; his mother, when he was seventeen.

One of the points in the tensions between the United States and Mexico was the exact location of Texas’s southern border. Texas claimed the Rio Grande as its southern border, but Mexico argued that the Nueces River was the true border.

President Polk sought a diplomatic solution with Mexico. He sent representatives to offer a deal to the Mexican government: a large sum of cash for the disputed regions of Texas, for New Mexico, and for California.

The attempted negotiations did not go well. The Mexican government was not inclined to yield any land, and the leadership of the government was in turmoil: key posts changed occupants several times within a year, so that diplomats from the United States were often negotiating with someone who’d just obtained the position and who would soon leave it.

Polk had sent General Zachary Taylor, first to Louisiana, and then into Texas, aware that military action might be in the offing. Taylor’s presence was primarily defensive, yet perhaps provocative.

When the seemingly inevitable war finally began, Taylor’s forces would operate along the border and into the northernmost regions of Mexico. Winfield Scott, however, would take the fight home to the Mexican heartland.

In addition to Taylor and Scott, other officers had significant roles. While Taylor, in conjunction with Brigadier General John Wool, worked from eastern Texas into northern Mexico, Colonel Kearny and Colonel Doniphan started from western Texas, Kearny heading west for southern California, and Doniphan heading south toward the Mexican town of Chihuahua and other points further south.

Wool, Doniphan, and Taylor would campaign around northeastern Mexico, in the vicinities of Monterrey and Saltillo.

President Polk was hoping for a short war, but General Winfield Scott had foreseen the likelihood of a longer engagement. Polk had given an important role to Taylor, partly for political reasons, at the beginning of the war. Taylor and Scott both had political potential and ambition. Taylor would be nominated by the Whig party for the presidency in 1848, Scott in 1852: Taylor successfully, Scott not.

Foreseeing such political activity, Polk hoped to give Taylor a strong public image by placing him in charge of the northern military operations against Mexico. Polk’s plan largely succeeded, and Taylor was viewed as a strong and successful military leader, boosting his political potential.

But the northern aspect of the Mexican war proved to be insufficient. Scott understood that engagement further south in Mexico would be necessary for victory. As the war continued, Polk eventually came to see the merit of Scott’s line of thought.

In Washington in November 1846, Polk and Scott decided to proceed with invasion plans. An amphibious landing would be made on Mexico’s eastern coast, at the town of Vera Cruz. Mapmakers sometimes make one word of the town's name: Veracruz. From there, Scott would lead the forces west toward Mexico City.

Scott appropriated significant numbers of soldiers from Taylor’s forces, which angered Taylor. Scott’s forces landed and captured the Vera Cruz in March 1847. Historian Russell Frank Weigley writes:

The object of Scott’s campaign was far clearer: to convince the Mexican government of the futility of prolonging the war, and perhaps to make its continued prolongation impossible, by capturing the capital and heart of the country, the City of Mexico. The territorial gains which the United States had sought in going to war against Mexico were already in the American hands or about to be when Scott’s campaign began. Taylor had assured American possession of Texas; and the combined efforts of the American settlers in California, the American Navy’s eastern Pacific squadron, John C. Fremont’s opera bouffe, and Brigadier General Stephen Watts Kearny’s Army of the West were capturing California. Kearny dropped off enough garrisons between Texas and California to terminate Mexican sovereignty in the intervening territory, especially when shielded by the anabasis of Colonel Alexander Doniphan’s one thousand across Chihuahua. Scott’s task was to persuade a Mexican government to grant formal recognition to these developments so that the United States could go about exploiting its conquests in as much peace as the resident Indians would permit.

Although Polk had wanted to fuel Taylor’s political chances, he saw that Scott was the wiser strategist. Taylor was worried that his electoral opportunities were being damaged. His worries, in hindsight, were misplaced. Taylor would end up in the White House; Scott would not.

Taylor’s nickname was “Old Rough and Ready,” which played well in the press. Scott’s nickname was “Old Fuss and Feathers,” because he insisted on discipline and uniforms. Taylor’s nickname was another political advantage. Historians Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski write:

Scott was an excellent choice. Since the war began he had argued that only a repetition of Cortes’s march to the valley of Mexico would end the war. When the administration first contemplated the expedition, Scott wrote the planning papers detailing the military requirements and establishing the operation’s feasibility. He estimated that 4,000 regulars and 10,000 volunteers would be needed and insisted that the Veracruz assault had to take place before yellow fever season began. Since little time remained to raise new regiments, Scott took more than half Taylor’s men, including almost all his regulars, and prudently ordered Old Rough and Ready to remain on the defensive. The expedition was a double blow to Taylor. Denied the opportunity to command it, he also lost most of his army. Polk and Scott, he fumed, had conspired to cut short his military career and deprive him of the 1848 Whig nomination.

The countryside which Scott entered was not unified. The internal dynamics of Mexican politics were determined by demographics. The turmoil at the top levels of the Mexican government - the rapid turnover of even the highest offices - mirrored deep divisions within Mexican society.

Some of these divisions had been fostered by the Spaniards earlier in Mexican history. Although Mexico had been independent of Spain since the early 1820s, various segments of society remained at odds with each other.

This would manifest itself during the war, as U.S. forces were welcomed in some areas and hated in others, and after the war, when the United States quickly became an ally of the nation it had so recently defeated. Historian Irving Levinson writes:

Unlike its British North American counterparts, colonial Mexico was a land in which the Indians and their offspring permanently outnumbered the European settlers and their descendants. Almost three centuries after European settlement began, the criollos (native-born whites) and the resident Spaniards together comprised barely 20 percent of Mexico’s population. That minority offered limited opportunity to the remainder of the population as the political, economic, and social levers of power in New Spain remained primarily under the control of Spanish officials and their acquisitive, resentful criollo colonists. In this environment, an arrangement emerged in which Indians who sought to retain control of some of their remaining preconquest lands received the protection of the Spanish Crown. In turn, the royal government used the Indians as a counterweight to colonists who sought to expand their own political and economic power at the expense of the metropolitan regime in Madrid. Also, the colony remained culturally divided as differing concepts of land ownership and political power generated continual conflict. These factors, combined with the heritage of a cruel Spanish conquest and of horrific conditions of forced labor, prevented the emergence of a unified colonial society.

While the Mexican government was not happy to lose the contested territory between the Rio Grande and the Nueces River, a significant number of Mexicans embraced the idea that the United States was the promulgator of the Monroe Doctrine.

The Mexicans had been encouraged by the example of the United States when they sought and gained their independence from Spain. The United States would also assist the Mexicans in retaining their independence when France attacked and attempted to subjugate Spain in the 1860s.

Saturday, February 21, 2015

Germans Fight for American Freedom

The winter of 1777/1778 was decisive in the American Revolution. Washington’s army achieved a mental victory by surviving at Valley Forge, and a military success in its training under the Prussian officer von Steuben.

While much is made of the benefit which German discipline bestowed on Washington’s army through von Steuben - his training enabled the army’s effectiveness when the winter ended - other Germans were at Valley Forge, and made significant contributions.

Johann DeKalb earned the rank of major general from Washington, and was placed in command of an entire division in November 1777. After marching his troops southward in 1780 to help confront Cornwallis, he was wounded and died in the fighting there in August 1780.

Cornwallis would surrender a little more than a year later, ending the war. Historian Thomas Sowell writes:

There were about 300,000 Germans in the American colonies - about 10 percent of the total population. Shortly after the war began, a volunteer company of Germans formed in Charleston, South Carolina, and four companies of infantry formed from the Germans around Reading, Pennsylvania. A German regiment was raised in Pennsylvania and Maryland. Four battalions of Germans were recruited in the Mohawk Valley. Germans served not only in the ranks but also in the highest levels of the American army. Peter Muhlenberg, son of the founder of the American Lutheran church, rose to become a general in the American army. General von Steuben came from his native land for the express purpose of fighting in the Revolutionary War. He served with Washington at Valley Forge, and has been credited with introducing military discipline into the new American army. Turning undisciplined civilians into professional soldiers was a formidable task, and von Steuben was known to curse both in German and French - and to ask his aide to curse for him in English! Yet as drillmaster of the American army, he succeeded in creating an army capable of defeating professional British troops. General von Steuben also helped plan the successful siege of Yorktown.

In late 1775, George Washington had personally asked Peter Muhlenberg to command a regiment within the Continental Army. Like DeKalb and von Steuben, Muhlenberg wintered at Valley Forge.

Peter Muhlenberg commanded a brigade at Yorktown, the last significant battle in the war. After the war he was elected to the House of Representatives, and died in 1807.

Sunday, February 15, 2015

Communist Front Organizations in the United States

After the 1917 revolutions - there were two - in Russia, and after the ensuing civil war, the Soviet Union solidified its rule. Part of its Marxist-Leninist vision was bringing communist revolutions to other countries.

For this purpose, an organization known as the ‘Communist International’ or ‘Comintern’ was formed. Its purpose was to coordinate the various communist parties which existed in different countries around the globe.

At first, the Comintern articulated a clear strategy of “violent revolution.” This took the form, in the United States, of a wave of bombings in 1919 and 1920.

The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), an organization which seemed prima facie to be a labor union, but which was actually an arm of Soviet communism, held the city of Seattle hostage in a general strike. The ordinary citizens of Seattle were denied basic necessities of life for several days while the IWW controlled the city.

In the long run, however, it became clear to the Comintern that a strategy of direct violent revolution would not likely succeed in some of the globe’s major industrialized democracies. The words “violent revolution,” which had previously appeared prominently in the literature of the Communist Party in the United States (CPUSA), slowly disappeared from the party’s printed materials.

Instead, the Comintern directed the CPUSA, the IWW, and other Soviet agencies to act in a more gradual, insidious, and subversive manner. The Comintern developed a strategy of using “front” organizations.

The development of communist fronts carried several advantages for the Soviets. The organizations could be formed and controlled, sometimes visibly or sometimes behind the scenes, by Soviet agents or by members of the CPUSA. But the members of the organizations didn’t have to be CPUSA members, which made it comfortable for more people to join these organizations, and made those members more useful to the Soviets, because those members could exert influence inside the United States without being obvious extensions of the Soviet Union.

Of the people who joined or supported communist front organizations, some did so knowingly: they were sympathizers, who might not be Soviet agents or members of the CPUSA, but who were in favor of the Comintern’s general goals. Others aided the Soviets unwittingly: they were “dupes” who thought that they were helping some noble humanitarian cause, and who had been fooled by the front.

Historian Kermit McKenzie describes how the Comintern developed the strategy of using front organizations:

In summary, it may be said that the Comintern outlined for the Communist parties in the capitalist countries during 1935-1939 an imaginative, flexible program of strategy and tactics, in which Communists were permitted to exploit the symbols of patriotism, to assume the role of defenders of national independence, to attack fascism without demanding an end to capitalism as the only remedy, and, most importantly, to enter upon alliances with other parties, on the basis of fronts or on the basis of a government in which Communists might participate. In all of this the fundamental aim of world Communism through violent revolution was retained, and the new pattern of strategy and tactics was pictured as excellent preparation toward that end.

Many of the communist fronts operating inside the United States assumed the pose of humanitarian or relief work. Others seemed to support cultural, artistic, or educational work. In reality, they worked to effect the violent overthrow of the United States government and to reduce the liberties enjoyed by citizens, and to do so in ways which could only result in human misery and loss of life.

Among these front organizations (approximately 200 of them were clearly identified; others may have escaped detection) were the American Council on Soviet Relations, the American Jewish Labor Council, the American League for Peace and Democracy, the American National Labor Party, the American National Socialist Party, the American Nationalist Party, the California Emergency Defense Committee, the Chopin Cultural Center, the Michigan School of Social Science, the Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art, the Voice of Freedom Committee, and the Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation.

The organizations named are merely a sampling of the many and varied fronts used by the Comintern.

Individuals in these fronts could exert influence in society or among policy makers; they could retrieve information and send it back to the Soviet Union; and they could do so largely avoiding suspicion. The Comintern learned well that a gradual subversive presence could do more harm to the United States than an overt attempt at violent revolution.

Wednesday, February 4, 2015

Before the Cold War

Although the Cold War is usually defined as lasting from 1947 to 1990, the dates are not precise. In any case, the years after the October 1917 revolution, and after the end of the Russian Civil War in 1920, were, like the Cold War, an era of rivalry between the USSR and the USA. This rivalry manifested itself in propaganda and espionage.

Both during the Cold War and during the decades preceding it, it was exceedingly difficult to identify, with any certainty, Soviet agents at work in the United States. Only with great effort was it possible to establish that people like Alger Hiss, Julius Rosenberg, Ethel Rosenberg, and others were in the employ of the KGB, NKVD, or some other Soviet intelligence agency.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, around 1990, the situation for historians changed drastically. A wealth of data became available. The intelligence agencies in the United States declassified large portions of the evidence gathered by the Venona project; Venona was a program to decrypt intercepted Soviet messages. In Russia, portions of the KGB’s files became available. Information came from other countries as well; for example, in Germany, the files of Stasi became public. The “Stasi” was the agency for Staatssicherheit or national security.

Suddenly, there was evidence revealing a thorough spy network which had functioned in the United States, not only during the Cold War, but also in the decades leading up to the mid-1940s. Soviet espionage was not only something relevant to studying the history of the 1950s and later, but it was quite significant in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.

A number of historians have begun examining this new trove of data. It will take years, if they are allowed, to uncover the expanse of the Soviet spy network which functioned for several decades in the United States.

One historian, M. Stanton Evans, has published some preliminary results from this new evidence. Known as “Stan” Evans, he writes:

Since the collapse of the Soviet empire in the early 1990s, we’ve learned a lot about Communist tactics used against the West in the long death struggle called the Cold War - much of it contrary to accepted wisdom in media/academic circles.

This new flood of data confirmed, for example, the conclusion drawn in the 1950s that Philip Keeney and Mary Jane Keeney were indeed Soviet agents. Working together, Stan Evans and Herbert Romerstein write:

Some of this information is brand-new, some of it confirming things already known, some completely unexpected - but all of it important. The revelations are the more so as the story of what actually happened in the clash of global superpowers that dominated the second half of the twentieth century has yet to be told in adequate fashion. For numerous reasons - some legitimate, others not - significant facts about this conflict were the deepest-dyed of secrets, denied outright or held back from the public, and even today aren’t common knowledge.

If historians are allowed to have continued access to this new source of evidence, and if they are allowed to publish their conclusions, the coming decades could see an expanding concept of the Soviet espionage network and of the international communist conspiracy as it was at work inside the United States from the earliest years after the 1917 revolution up until shortly before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990.

Saturday, January 24, 2015

War with Mexico Shapes History

Texas was a part of Mexico until 1836. It declared itself independent of Mexico, and after a brief war, established itself as a republic. Mexico begrudgingly allowed Texas to exist as an independent country, but when Texas joined the United States in 1845, Mexico decided to try to get Texas back.

President James Polk hoped to use diplomatic means to persuade Mexico to allow Texas to join the Union. He offered to buy large areas of land - what are now California and New Mexico - and thereby enrich the Mexican government, which was hoping to create a roadblock to Texas’s statehood by disputing the exact location of Texas’s southern border.

The Mexican government, already hoping to stop Texas from becoming one of the United States, was in no mood to sell other pieces of land to the U.S., even if such a deal meant millions of dollars for Mexico. As historians Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski write,

The question of Texas’s southern boundary aggravated the annexation issue. Texas claimed the Rio Grande, but Mexico insisted the Nueces River was the border. Accepting the Texans’ interpretation, Polk ordered Brigadier General Zachary Taylor to assume a position “on or near” the Rio Grande. Taylor stopped at Corpus Christi at the mouth of the Nueces, which was neither on nor very near the Rio Grande, but Polk acquiesced. However, on January 12, 1846, Polk learned his special envoy had failed to persuade Mexico to accept the Rio Grande boundary and to sell New Mexico and California. The next day he ordered Taylor to the Rio Grande. By late March the general’s Army of Occupation had concentrated opposite Matamoros. From Polk’s perspective Taylor had assumed a forward defensive position; the Mexicans considered Taylor’s advance an invasion.

While Zachary Taylor was maneuvering on Mexico’s northern border, diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico went from bad to worse. Finally, gunfire erupted between groups of soldiers when the Mexican ambushed two of Taylor’s squadrons. Then actual battles took place. Finally, on May 13, Congress declared war on Mexico.

While the initial fighting took place on that northern border, General Winfield Scott was preparing for a landing and invasion into Mexico from the southeast. This would be a major amphibious operation, as Brion McClanahan writes:

Scott was sixty when the Mexican War began in 1846. His young man’s dreams of military glory had long departed; because of his age, Scott preferred that younger men take the reigns of battle in Mexico. But fate would intervene. Scott was sent to Mexico by President James K. Polk and commanded the southern arm of the two field armies. In 1847 he invaded Mexico at Veracruz - the first large-scale amphibious assault in American history, surpassed only by Operation Overlord (D-Day) in 1944. He punished the Mexican army and pushed quickly toward Mexico City. Scott was aided by the outstanding leadership of several subordinates, among them Robert E. Lee - Scott called him the finest soldier he had ever seen - and Thomas J. Jackson. Scott captured Mexico City within five months of landing on the Mexico beaches. He had become the conqueror of Mexico and a household name in the United States.

In addition to Robert E. Lee, other officers sent to Mexico were Ulysses S. Grant, Jefferson Davis, and James Longstreet. Action in Mexico was thus a common threat, fifteen years later, among officers on both sides of the Civil War. Winfield Scott was by that time too old to be on active duty, but did function as a military advisor to President Lincoln. Zachary Taylor would die shortly after the war with Mexico and long before the Civil war.

Zachary Taylor would gain attention as a hero of the war, and subsequently elected president. Winfield Scott, however, may have been the better commander of the two, but got less attention in the newspapers of the day.

Winfield Scott, while not receiving the type of media attention which would get him into the White House, was still popular among ordinary citizens of the United States. He fit into, and simultaneously helped to shape, the concept of an American military hero. He was victorious, and yet scrupulous in his regard for human life. He was brilliant in his strategy and tactics, yet clear in his consideration for the rights and dignity of the inhabitants of the territories he conquered. Winfield Scott typifies what is most admirable in the American military tradition, and in the military tradition of Western Civilization: a frank acknowledgement that, while the evils of war are necessary, the evils of war also should be minimized. As historian Russell Frank Weigley writes,

Winfield Scott’s greatest campaign, from Veracruz to the halls of the Montezumas in the Mexican War, permitted him to wage limited war in the pre-Napoleonic, eighteenth-century style most congenial to him. He conducted the campaign with strict regard for the rights of the citizens of the invaded territories, with every effort to confine bloodshed and suffering to the enemy’s armed forces and to avoid inflicting them upon civilians. He imposed stringent regulations to compel orderly conduct from his soldiers in their dealings with the Mexican populace and to confine the opportunities for friction to the minimum necessary for the sustenance of his army and the morale of his troops. He forbade forced requisitions and insisted upon the purchase of supplies, this despite a most precarious logistical situation at the end of a long supply line across the Gulf of Mexico and through the yellow-fever belt of the Mexican coast. After he landed near Veracruz, he eschewed the sort of costly assault which his colleague Zachary Taylor had recently employed in similar circumstances to take the fortified city of Monterrey, preferring instead to save lives through a formal siege of the eighteenth-century style (with the ironic result that because Scott’s casualties at Veracruz were low, the American public inclined to believe that Taylor’s capture of the weaker defenses of Monterrey was a greater achievement; after all, the price was higher). Throughout his campaign, Scott avoided all-out battle whenever it was possible to do so and husbanded lives by substituting maneuver for combat with all the frugality of a general of the ancien regime.

Without detracting from the accomplishments of either Taylor or Scott, historian Irving Levinson offers a slightly different perspective on the war. It is all too easy to frame the narrative of a war as a struggle between two monolithic nation-states, and ignore the internal tensions within those states, and the effects of those tensions on the war. Levinson details the different segments of Mexican society, and how each had a slightly different stance vis-a-vis the war:

I contend that an additional force of Mexicans played a critical and heretofore unknown role. As the U.S. Army advanced towards Mexico City, the repeated destruction of Mexican military formations deprived Mexico’s repressive regime of the most important tool by which that nation’s rulers secured their dominant economic and political positions. Consequently and concurrently, a broadly based rebellion led by disenfranchised rural Mexicans erupted and soon posed so great a menace to the existing social order that those who ruled Mexico sought first peace and then aid from the United States to crush this uprising. In this new perspective, Mexico stands as a society whose distinct history and resulting characteristics defined the types of action open to both governments during the war. With that said, a brief description of the realities of the nation in which almost all of the fighting took place stands as our first task.

Although the war with Mexico was smaller, by various metrics, than other wars in United States history, it was significant. It gave us a president in Taylor, a presidential hopeful in Scott, a series of officers who would shape the Civil War, a clear example of the American ethic of humane treatment of civilians in wartime, and geographical boundaries which shape North America two centuries later.

Friday, January 23, 2015

Tuskegee Airmen - As It Really Happened

From the time at which both elementary schools and high schools began requiring classes which included “the civil rights movement” and “African-American History,” the famous ‘Tuskegee Airmen’ have become familiar icons alongside Rosa Parks, W.E.B. DuBois, Frederick Douglas, and a host of other famous Black Americans. But aside from the vague notion that these airmen were pilots in WWII, the typical student has no detailed understanding of what they actually did, despite the fact that both documentary films and a Hollywood movie have portrayed their exploits.

Historian William Percy provides insight into who the Tuskegee airmen were, and what they did; this knowledge can transform them from one-dimensional characters in a rehearsed civil rights narrative into the three- or four-dimensional historical individuals they actually were.

The “airmen” actually included commissioned officers, an important step for African-Americans in the Army (no separate Air Force existed until after WII). Their exemplary work in a ‘semi-integrated’ setting, as Percy calls it, gave the Air Corps a head start over the other branches of the military in achieving further integration. The Army itself had operated in a highly segregated manner since the administration of Woodrow Wilson; soldiers recruited from the South, who had already lived under ‘Jim Crow’ laws, were familiar with the system, but soldiers from the North – both white and black – were sometimes surprised by the system, having attended, e.g., the integrated high schools in many Northern cities. Having served and fought in ‘semi-integrated’ settings, returning to segregated Army bases in the U.S. was a rude awakening for some of the airmen.

Higher officers in the Army Air Force, the AAF, acknowledged the accomplishments of the Tuskegee units – the 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group – but saw the integration of African-Americans into AAF as a wartime necessity or a political statement, and seemed willing to return to the segregated status quo antebellum.

One reason for the success of the 332nd was their leader, Colonel B.O. Davis, Jr.; he was a West Point graduate and was praised by his superiors, General Eaker and General Dean Strother. The airmen compiled an impressive record; measured by nearly any statistic – number of missions, number of enemy craft shot down, number of medals earned, etc. – they performed as well as, or better than, other units. The only criticism made of them was that they might have more aggressively pursued enemy fighter planes; but this criticism fails to consider the fact that, to make such pursuit, they would have had to leave the bombers which they were escorting, and giving escort was their assigned task at that moment. Thus it was that no bomber escorted by the Tuskegee pilots was ever shot down by enemy fire: this unique statistic is one of their main claims to fame.

Various specific anecdotes serve to illustrate the heroism for which these men became known. On a sixteen-hundred-mile raid to Berlin, bombers were to be accompanied by three different fighter groups: one group for the first third of the mission, another group for the second third, and a final group for the remainder of the flight. The Tuskegee pilots were assigned to the middle third, but when the final group of fighters failed to appear at the rendezvous point to takeover escort duty and relieve the Tuskegee pilots, the Tuskegee fighters continued protected the bombers for the remainder of the mission, including shooting down at least three ME-262 jet fighters, a feat which earned them a Distinguished Unit Citation.

Among the white officers and white airmen of AAF, there were certainly some whose racists attitudes emoted a strong distaste for working with the ‘Negroes’ – the majority of white fliers, however, respected and appreciated the work of Black airmen and officers. High-ranking AAF officers, including even General “Hap” Arnold, visited the bases and praised the ‘Negro airmen.’ Aside from friendliness and praising the skill of the Black pilots, the crews of the American bombers realized that the Tuskegee airmen had saved their lives in many situations. When a bomber suffered either mechanical difficulties, or damage from enemy fire, and had to separate from the formation and return to its base alone, it was especially vulnerable to German fighters, and especially thankful for the protective escort of the Tuskegee fliers.

The 332nd Fighter Group was formed in January 1942 and arrived in Europe in January 1944. Initially, the 332nd was equipped with P-39 fighter which had inferior technical features, and the missions given to the 332nd were underwhelming, as William Percy notes:

Upon reaching their base of operations, the black airmen became thoroughly disgusted when they learned of their new assignment. Having been prevented from taking the 99th out of combat some months earlier, the AAF ordered the 332nd to carry out coastal patrol to protect Allied shipping between Naples and Anzio, a relatively uneventful and unimportant task. The G-3 study absolving the 99th of Momyer’s evaluations would not come out until March, so perhaps the AAF felt justified in giving the 332nd this duty. Davis felt that “to assign the group to a non-combat role at a critical juncture in the war seemed a betrayal of everything we had worked for, and an intentional insult to me and my men.” For the next three months, aside from an occasional ground-support mission over Anzio, the 332nd flew boring, routine patrols, during which time the group came into contact with only three German reconnaissance planes. To make matters worse, at the beginning of this assignment, the 99th had just scored its incredible tally of victories on 27 and 28 January, making the new arrivals yearn even more for actual combat.

Bombers needed protection, however, and the 332nd was re-tasked to escort them, was re-equipped with technically superior P-47 aircraft, and earned its fame protecting the vulnerable B-17 and B-24 bombers.

The 99th Fighter Squadron was older than the 332nd, having been founded in July 1941. The 99th trained at Tuskegee on a variety of non-combat ‘trainer’ aircraft – the BT-13 and the AT-6 – and was then equipped with P-40 fighters. The 99th arrived in Africa in April 1943. (The reader may recall a TV series from the 1960’s called “Rat Patrol” which captured the flavor of the North African Theater of combat.) After training briefly with the 27th Fighter Group, the 99th was assigned to the 33rd Fighter Group; the 99th was with the 33rd for only May and June of 1943. The officers of the 33rd alternated between ignoring the 99th and belittling it; while individual officers, and most of the airmen, of the 33rd were supportive of the 99th, the commander set a hostile tone. The 99th was reassigned to the 324th Fighter Group in June 1943. The 324th was somewhat better to the 99th:

Fortunately for the black pilots, their “direct” relations with the 33rd concluded at the end of the month. On 29 June, the 99th moved to El Haouria, Tunisia, on the tip of the Cape Bon Peninsula. Here it began operating with the 324th Fighter Group, which was engaged in the battle of Sicily. Assigned to its own base and flying almost exclusively its own separate missions, the 99th had even less contact with the 324th than it had experienced with the 33rd. Unlike the 33rd’s staff, however, the 324th’s intelligence officers fully credited the black squadron for its escort and ground-support missions over Sicily during the short time the two units “officially” operated together. In preparation for the invasion of Sicily, the 99th helped soften the German defenses by escorting medium bombers and dive-bombing and strafing enemy airfields, supply centers, and communication lines.

The 324th, however, seemed more puzzled than anything else at the African-American airmen, and largely ignored them, keeping them segregated and sending them on their own missions apart from the white squadrons. It was during this time, over Sicily, that the 99th got its first confirmed kill, and the highest officers visited the 99th to congratulate: General Eisenhower, General Doolittle, Air Vice Marshal Coningham of the RAF, and other superstars of air power. This demonstrated that the Tuskegee fliers were being supported and watched by the top-level officers, even if the mid-level officers seemed oblivious or antagonistic. (“Ike” Eisenhower also integrated ground troops during the Battle of the Bulge, long before President Truman’s postwar executive order to integrate the armed services.)

In July 1943, the 99th was reassigned back to the 33rd Fighter Group. This time, the 33rd was less hostile to the 99th; instead, the 33rd merely ignored the 99th. In October 1943, the 99th squadron was reassigned to join the 79th Fighter Group. Of the groups to which the 99th had belonged so far, the 79th was by far the best. The 99th was one of four squadrons in the group, and duties were assigned equally. In January 1994, the 99th had twelve confirmed kills in two days, establishing a level of performance comparable to any other unit. While with the 79th, the men of the 99th enjoyed a collegial and professional relationship with the white fighter pilots of the 79th’s other three squadrons; this marks a high point in race relations. Also while with the 79th, the 99th began upgrading to P-47’s to replace their P-40’s, a signal that highly-placed officers had confidence in the 99th and were investing in its future. In April 1944, the 99th was reassigned back to the 324th, were they were largely ignored by the white officers but continued to perform excellently, particularly in support of U.S. Army ground forces in Italy. In June 1944, the 99th was reassigned to the 86th Fighter Group. After June 1944, the 99th was assigned to the 332nd, where it would remain for the duration. With the 332nd, the 99th would have new duties as bomber escorts.

This dizzying summary of the 99th’s history and 332nd’s history suffices to demonstrate two points: first, that the Black pilots performed well; second, that some white officers were hostile and some were friendly. In any event, the Tuskegee fighter pilots certainly earned their places in the history books.

The value of William Percy’s article is this: it transforms vague icons into concrete data. References to “The Tuskegee Airmen” appear in every standard presentation about “the civil rights movement” and about “African-American History,” but remain merely imprecise allusions. It is a disservice to these warriors to allow them to remain icons; such symbols are instruments, carrying little meaning in themselves, and used for whatever goals various rhetoricians may choose. The Tuskegee Airmen were not merely symbols or metaphors, but rather real men, servicemen who saw combat. They are not merely tokens to be used in a game of civil-rights discourse; they protected their loved ones and their nation. Only a presentation of quantifiable and observable data, such as William Percy gives us, confirms that the Tuskegee pilots were and not merely figments in the imagination of some political leader who creates exhibitions and lectures for schoolchildren. The Tuskegee airmen were flesh-and-blood heroes.

Thursday, January 22, 2015

Paine vs. Monarchy = Liberty vs. Tyranny

Among many other topics in his writings, Thomas Paine formulated arguments against monarchy and in favor of representative government. He articulated these arguments in different ways in different texts over the years.

In 1792, he authored a tract in response to a royal proclamation issued against seditious writings. He was among the targets, perhaps the chief target, of this royal edict. Paine's tract was printed and published in England, and its publishers were prosecuted as a result.

In this tract, Paine asked the reader to examine the notion of monarchy in the abstract, apart from “custom and usage.” He argues that familiarity lulls people into accepting that which is rationally unacceptable.

“Antiquity and precedent,” Paine writes, obscure the irrationality of the practice of granting sovereign governing power purely on the basis of inheritance. There is a linguistic element to this fallacy: merely because an individual has inherited a title such as ‘king’ or ‘lord’ does not in any way entail that this individual is more fit to govern than any other individual. Paine writes:

To say that the Government of this country is composed of King, Lords, and Commons, is the mere phraseology of custom. It is composed of men; and whoever the men be to whom the Government of any country is entrusted, they ought to be the best and wisest that can be found, and if they are not so, they are not fit for the station. A man derives no more excellence from the change of a name, or calling him King, or calling him Lord, than I should do by changing my name from Thomas to George, or from Paine to Guelph, I should not be a whit the more able to write a book, because my name were altered; neither would any man, now called a King or a Lord, have a whit the more sense than he now has, were he to call himself Thomas Paine.

It is also a politico-linguistic error, Paine continues, to label a segment of society as ‘commoners.’ He continues his argument by asking the reader to imagine that a country had to formulate its government ab initio. Given an abstract description of a hereditary monarchy, no nation would rationally and voluntarily adopt such a plan of government. Devastatingly, Paine proceeds to describe the English monarchy:

First — That some one individual should be taken from all the rest of the nation, and to whom all the rest should swear obedience, and never be permitted to sit down in his presence, and that they should give to him one million sterling a year. — That the nation should never after have power or authority to make laws but with his express consent, and that his sons and his sons’ sons, whether wise or foolish, good men or bad, fit or unfit, should have the same power, and also the same money annually paid to them for ever.
Secondly — That there should be two houses of Legislators to assist in making laws, one of which should, in the first instance, be entirely appointed by the aforesaid person, and that their sons and their sons’ sons, whether wise or foolish, good men or bad, fit or unfit, should for ever after be hereditary Legislators.
Thirdly — That the other house should be chosen in the same manner as the house, now called the House of Commons, is chosen, and should be subject to the control of the two aforesaid hereditary Powers in all things.

Paine goes on to discuss the absurdities of the monarchy, thus described, at length. While this 1792 text contains one of his most powerful arguments against monarchy, it is not his most famous or influential.

Among Paine’s many writings, two emerge as his most prominent: Common Sense and The Crisis. Both rallied support for the cause of independence at crucial moments during the revolutionary era. The former was written in 1776, and the latter was a series of articles written from 1776 to 1783. Both contained arguments against monarchy, as well as arguments on other topics.

The publication of Common Sense, according to British philosopher A.J. Ayer, “played a decisive part in persuading” the residents of North America to seek independence from England. But Ayer also opines that this, Paine’s most famous and influential argument against monarchy, is also his weakest. Paine’s writing mustered support for the cause of independence; Ayer, however, asks:

How did Paine achieve it? More by rhetoric, of which he was a master, than by force of argument. His arguments are on two levels, not always kept distinct. In part they are designed to prove the superiority in general of representative over monarchical or aristocratic forms of government. Here the thrust of the reasoning is mainly negative. The emphasis is laid rather on the evils of any form of hereditary government, especially monarchy, than on the merits of representative government, though Paine does use the argument that it will prove convenient ‘to leave the legislative part to be managed by a select number chosen from the whole body, who are supposed to have the same concerns at stake which those have who appointed them, and who will act in the same manner as teh whole body would act were they present.’ Evidently this argument applies only to a small and harmonious electorate. Paine makes a faint attempt to cope with this difficulty by proposing that as the electorate increases, constituencies should be multiplied and elections held more frequently, but already there is a narrow limit to the practicability of these reforms, unless we shift to a much greater degree of decentralization than anything Paine envisages.

Whether one favors Paine’s argumentation of 1792 or his argumentation of 1776, he not only lived during, but significantly shaped, the era in which nation-states began to reject monarchies, absolute or near-absolute, as a form of government. It can be reasonably argued that Paine’s influence could be detected around the globe for two or three centuries after he produced these texts.

While Paine’s argumentation was produced at a time when men were wresting freedom from monarchs, similar argumentation can be used to wrest liberty from non-dynastic bureaucrats, or to protect liberty from encroaching officialdom. Echoing Paine’s sentiments, but writing more than two hundred years later, Mark Levin notes that the freedom-seeking and liberty-conscious patriot, the citizen who wishes to protect his rights,

is alarmed by the ascent of a soft tyranny and its cheery acceptance by the neo-Statist. He knows that liberty once lost is rarely recovered. He knows of the decline and eventual failure of past republics. And he knows that the best prescription for addressing society’s real and perceived ailments is not to further empower an already enormous federal government beyond its constitutional limits, but to return to the founding principles. A free people living in a civil society, working in self-interested cooperation, and a government operating within the limits of its authority promote more prosperity, opportunity, and happiness for more people than an alternative.

A limited, clearly and effectively limited, government composed of freely-elected representatives, allowing for free markets and free speech, Levin continues, “is the antidote to tyranny precisely because its principles are the founding principles.”

Paine’s career reached its highpoint during the revolutionary era, 1775 to 1783. Thereafter, his influence and popularity declined, due to his misunderstood engagement with the French Revolution, and due to misunderstood attacks on religious institutions. Regarding the former, Paine was not a blind supporter of the atrocities committed by leaders of the French Revolution, and in fact attempted to persuade them into more humane measures. Regarding the latter, Paine was no atheist, but an exponent of some type of theism or deism, who criticized the human institutions and traditions of religion, not the existence of the deity they worshipped. But American readers were given superficial or inaccurate accounts of his activities, leading to a decline in his popularity.