Yet spies do more than gather intelligence. They often plant falsehoods into the systems of the government against which they are working. They hope that the officials in that government will act on the basis of these fabrications.
Spies also work to insinuate themselves into circles of power, whether by gaining posts in a government, or by becoming confidants and eventually influencers in political organizations. In these situations, spies can not only gain access to secrets and plant fabrications, but they can also influence decision-makers in the government and eventually become decision-makers in the government: in the very government which they are attempting to destroy.
Finally, spies sometimes commit acts of violence: sabotage and assassination.
From the earliest days of Soviet Socialism, starting with the revolutions of 1917, Soviet operatives inside the United States functioned in all the ways discussed above. Concrete examples include Alger Hiss, who had a stellar government career. He served as a clerk for a Supreme Court justice, and went on to work in the Justice Department. He then was an assistant to a Senate committee. In 1936, Hiss began working at the State Department. He held an impressive and ever higher series of government posts until he retired from government work in late 1946. In the latter years of his career, Alger Hiss met frequently in face-to-face meetings with President Roosevelt, and became a trusted advisor to the president. Not only did Hiss meet frequently with Roosevelt in the White House, but he traveled with him to the Yalta conference in February 1945. In Yalta, a city on the Crimean Peninsula, Roosevelt met with Stalin and Winston Churchill to make decisions about the postwar reorganization of Europe. Hiss exerted significant influence over Roosevelt at the conference; indeed, Roosevelt sometimes merely did whatever Hiss told him to do.
Alger Hiss was also a paid spy working for the NKVD. The NKVD was a predecessor of the KGB. Alger Hiss was a Soviet agent.
Another specific example is Harry Dexter White. He worked in the Treasury Department from 1934 to 1946. He had decisive influence in the shaping of U.S. policies. He was a paid agent, working for the Soviet Socialists.
One tactic used by espionage agents is to find a naive and sympathetic individual who will be easily influenced. This individual will not be aware that he is being manipulated by sinister forces, yet will act in ways which support those forces. Soviet spies like Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White did exactly this with Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
Morgenthau was the United States Secretary of the Treasury from 1934 to 1945 during the Roosevelt administration. Morgenthau formulated economic policy, both for the years of WW2 and projected for the postwar global economy. In this context, he is often cited as the author of the “Morgenthau Plan,” a policy proposal which would have devastated what little remained of the German economy and infrastructure at war’s end.
Not only would this policy have been an attempt to consign the German people, already suffering after a dozen years of Nazi oppression, permanently to a third-world status, but it would have also removed an important line of defense: in order to shield western Europe from a Soviet attack, West Germany needed to have a solid infrastructure and industrial base to support the thousands of Allied troops stationed there.
The plan called for Germany to be stripped of its industrial base and physical infrastructure, leaving the land “agricultural and pastoral.” Morgenthau’s personal motive may have been a sense of justice: Morgenthau felt that Germany needed to be punished for war crimes, and that Germany should not be given the opportunity to rebuild itself. Historians use the phrase “harsh peace” to describe Morgenthau’s approach. Morgenthau may have also thought that Germany should be kept weak, lest it start another war.
Whatever Morgenthau’s emotional motives may have been, the plan itself was shaped decisively by Harry Dexter White. As a Soviet operative, White saw that a weakened Germany would give the Soviet Socialists a better chance in any potential future invasion of western Europe. Harry Dexter White used Henry Morgenthau’s emotions to get Morgenthau to promote the plan.
Henry Morgenthau provided the unfocused emotion and bitter passion needed to sell the plan as justice. Harry Dexter White created the details of the plan, calculated to serve Stalin’s interests, leave western Europe vulnerable, and facilitate the enslavement of millions when the Soviet attack happened.
The Morgenthau Plan should have been titled the Harry Dexter White Plan.
At the same time, Alger Hiss was using his influence to persuade President Roosevelt that America could trust Stalin. Under Hiss’s influence, Roosevelt accepted Stalin’s promise, given with no guarantees, that the Soviet Socialists would allow free and fair elections in the countries of eastern Europe — the countries already, or soon to be, occupied by the Soviet army. Millions of people in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, and elsewhere would be subjugated to the Soviet Socialist dictatorship because Alger Hiss persuaded President Roosevelt to grant Stalin’s wish.
Historians know with confidence that not only Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White, but also dozens of other high-ranking officials inside the U.S. government, were Soviet agents. Although much of this was known, and some of it suspected, prior to 1995, it was in that year that the National Security Agency (NSA) declassified some documents from its Venona Project. These documents, dating from 1943 to 1980, were intercepted communications between individuals in the Soviet espionage network inside the United States. The NSA had to decrypt these messages, as they were written in code. These messages identified those officials inside the U.S. government who were working for the Soviet Socialists.
In 1952, Whittaker Chambers wrote about Soviet intelligence activity. He himself had been a Soviet agent. He knew firsthand the workings of the Soviet espionage network. But in 1952, the Venona papers had not yet been published, and so he lacked documentation for some of what he wrote. He would be vindicated 43 years later, when the Venona decryptions were declassified. In one of his books, Whittaker Chambers wrote:
In a situation with few parallels in history, the agents of an enemy power were in a position to do much more purloin documents. They were in a position to influence the nation’s foreign policy in the interest of the nation’s chief enemy, and not only on exceptional occasions, like Yalta (where Hiss’s role, while presumably important, is still ill-defined) or through the Morgenthau plan for the destruction of Germany (which is generally credited to White) but in what must have been the staggering sum of day to day decisions. That power to influence policy has always been the ultimate purpose of the Communist Party’s infiltration. It was much more dangerous, and, as events have proved, much more difficult to detect, than espionage, which beside it is trivial, though the two go hand in hand.
Chambers not only identifies Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White, but points to the multiple tasks of the Soviet espionage network, i.e., that the agents did more than steal secrets.
Stan Evans and Herbert Romerstein highlight the accuracy of the statements made by Chambers. This precision is even more remarkable, given that Chambers wrote before the declassification of the Venona decryptions.
Chambers was correct about the roles of Hiss and White, though now accessible records that prove the point weren’t open to inspection when he made this comment.
Evans and Romerstein also give credit to Chambers for pointing out that the Soviet espionage network did more than steal secrets: “As to the relative importance of policy influence compared to spying, Chambers” indicated that Soviet agents planted disinformation and influenced policy decisions to a nearly unimaginable extent. The president of the United States was sitting in the Oval Office, having friendly one-on-one policy discussions with a man who reported to the Kremlin.
Because Chambers had himself been a Soviet agent, his account of at least a segment of the spy network was authentic and detailed. Evans and Romerstein show that Chambers gave one of the most significant descriptions of the Soviet intelligence apparatus: “That sums up the matter about as well as it can be stated.”
Ultimately, the truth became manifest. Alger Hiss was sent to prison. Harry Dexter White’s Morgenthau Plan was rejected in favor of rebuilding Germany. The purposes of peace, justice, and freedom were served. That is good news.
Sadly, however, Hiss and White — and dozens of other Soviet spies operating inside the United States at the time — did substantial damage: they emboldened Stalin and his successors. They are at least partly responsible for the deaths in the Hungarian Uprising, the armed suppression of the Prague Spring, the Korean War, the Vietnam war, and other incidents around the globe.
